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IN"TRODLICTI0NY
In the last several decades, scores of new competition laws
have been adopted and National Competition Authorities
("N CAs"') established around the wsorld.' In every instance of
which we are awsare, a decision of the NCA is subject to judicial
reviews. The path to review varies, as does the destination. The
reviewsing court may be a court of general jurisdiction or it may
*Senior ( ircoit Judge. U.nited Statcs C our t of ~ppcals tor the tDistrict of Columbhia
Circuit, and 1'roiessor of Laxw, G;eorge Mlason University.
Cnmmisioner, F'ederal Trade Commoission, and 1'roiessor, George Mason
U.nixversity School of Laxx and tDcpartment of Economics (on leaxve). All xvicws are n
own and do not necessarily represent those of the Commitssion or any other
Com~missioner.
Y TIhc anithots thank Angela IDixelc. D~aniel H-aar. Matthew Seligmian, Nico-as
Charbit and the Instiute of Competition Law, for research assistance, and Hagit
Bulmash, Bruce H-offiman, Judge P'eter Roth (UK)y, and Valeria Silva for valuable
commentcs on car lier drats of this essay.
1. or the competition laws of some 170) countries, see Competition & Consumer
Protection Art horities. 1'1'orldnide, U .S. FFD) TRADE (COMM'N, http:,/xvxvxx' ftc gox /oia/
authotitics.shu. (last modified Fcb. 7, 2013).
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be a tribunal that specializes in the review of NCA decisions. In
countries that provide a private right of action for an antitrust
violation, again a generalist or a specialist court may hear the
matter in the first instance and/or on appeal.
Specialization can take any of several forms, so it is best
seen as a matter of degree, depending upon both the
percentage of a court's cases (or workload) arising under the
antitrust laws and the degree to which the judges of a court have
skills or training specific to antitrust.
At one end of the spectrum are the generalist courts of the
United States, such as the twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals that
review the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and, in
private cases, the judgments of the federal trial courts. Antitrust
cases account for less than one percent of the total caseload in
each of the appellate courts. A somewhat more specialized
model can be found in some countries, such as Portugal, where
(from 2008 until the creation in 2012 of a single antitrust court)
the review of NCA decisions has been vested in the commercial
section of the geographically competent general court.
Another variation of the somewhat specialized model appears in
France, where all challenges to the decision of the NCA are

referred to a particular chamber of the Paris Court of Appeals
that hears other types of cases as well. A still more specialized
model puts review of the NCA's decision in a "business" or
"commercial" court, such as the Market Court in Finland or
Chamber 13 of the Council of State in Turkey. A bit further
along the spectrum are courts that specialize in reviewing
economic regulatory decisions, such as the Competition Appeals
Tribunal in the United Kingdom, which reviews decisions of the
NCA and of the various sectoral regulators. Finally, there are

2. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS:
2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, tl. B-7 (2011) [hereinafter AOUS]. The

ninety-four federal district courts decide in the first instance cases brought by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or by a private antitrust plaintiff. Id. tl.

C-2A. In each of the past five years, antitrust cases accounted for less than half of one
percent of their overall case load, though the percentage was no doubt soinewhat
higher in at least a few districts. Id.
3. See The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2012: Portugal, GLOBAL
COMPETITION
RLVILw,
httl: /www.globalcomrpe titionreview.com / handbooks/ 45
sections/ 153/chapters/ 1767/portugal (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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courts, such as the Competition Appellate Tribunal of India,
that review decisions of the NCA alone.4
In addition to these variations in the degree of
specialization reflected in the formal structure of review,
informal or "opinion" specialization by a particular panel or
judge is yet another possibility. When he was President of the
European Court of First Instance, where antitrust cases are a
significant part of the docket, Judge Bo Vesterdorf took special
responsibility for antitrust matters, as Judge Nicholas Forwood
now may be doing. Such informal specialization also occurs in
certain subject areas, including antitrust, in the appellate courts
of the United States.
No matter what the arrangement for initial review of the
NCA decision or review of a trial court in a private action, there
is always an upper level reviewing court of general jurisdiction,
whether mandatory or discretionary. Few antitrust cases,
however, reach that level in any jurisdiction except the
European Union.
In addition to the antitrust share of a court's total docket,
another important dimension of specialization among
competition tribunals relates to the specialized human capital
they bring to bear upon review NCA decisions. For example, the
specialized tribunals in Canada and the United Kingdom 8 may,

4. Yet another variation vests initial review of National Competition Authorities
("NCAs") decisions in an appellate division of the NCA itself, which seems to be the
arrangement in Australia and in Victnam.
5. See Edward K. Cheng The Myth of the GeneralistJudge,61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526
(2008) (arguing that opinion specialization is "an unmistakable part of everyday
judicial practice" in US federal circuit courts).
6. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided twelve antitrust cases in

the last ten years. From 2007 to 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union
decided 100 antitrust cases. COURT OF

JUSTICE

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNU AL

RLPORT 2011, tbl. 9 at 104 (2011). Antitrust cases account for 1.5% of the Supreme
Court's opinions and about 4% of the opinions of the Court ofJustice. Id. tbl. 9 at 10405 (2011).
7. See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. (Can.); Competition Tribunal Act.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.) 1 3(2) (Can.) ("The [Canadian Competition] Tribunal
shall consist of ... not more than six members to be appointed from among the judges
of the Federal Court by the Governor in Council ... [and] not more than eight other
members [all] to be appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of
the Minister [of justice]."); Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (2d Supp.)

1

3(3) (Can.) ("The Governor in Council may establish an advisory council to advise

the Minister wvith respect to appointments of lay members, which council is to be
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variously, include among the three judges on panel one or two
lay members expert in industrial organization economics or
public affairs, or with relevant business experience. l In this way,
the mix of skills among the judges may be tailored to the needs
of each particular case.
The proliferation of tribunals reviewing NCA decisions
invites inquiry as to whether one degree or another of
specialization provides more satisfactory results, however
measured. We set out to investigate what has made for a more or
less
successful
institutional
design,
using
economic
sophistication as our criterion of success. Bearing in mind that a
court might resolve a close question of antitrust economics in
more than one way, we proposed to use as a proxy for economic
sophistication the degree, if any, to which the tribunal made
reference to and relied upon relevant economic literature. In
particular, we hoped to investigate how generalist and specialist
courts analyzed certain issues that could be expected to arise in
many jurisdictions, such as the standard for predatory pricing
and the analyses used to determine whether a price or margin
squeeze, a vertical restraint, or price discrimination is unlawful.
composed of not more than ten members who are knowledgeable in economics,
industry, commerce or public affairs ....") .

8. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. §12 (U.K.) (establishing the Competition Appeal
Tribunal);

see

also

About

the

Tribunal,

COMPETITION

APPEAL

TRIBU NAL,

http: /www.catribunal.org.uk/242/About-the-Tribunal.htmLi
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013)
("Cases are heard before a Tribunal consisting of three members: either the President
or a member of the panel of chairmen and two ordinary members. The members of the
pancl of chairmen are judges of the Chancery Division of the High Court and other
scnior lawyers. The ordinary members have expertise in law. business, accountancy,
economics and other related fields."); Fee-Paid Chairman oJ the Competition Appeal
Tribunal, U.K. JU DICIA1L PPOINTMIENTS COIM'N, http://jacjudiciay gov.uk/selectionprocess/ selection-exercise s/in-progress/ 1651.hti (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (noting,
in advertising to l11 positions of Chairman of the Competition Appeal Tribunal
"Chairmen will be expected to lead two lay members with expertise in economics,
business, accountancy, academia, law and public affairs, to provide dcear direction on
law and procedure").
9. See also Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, 42 LSI 135 (1987-88), art.
23(b) (Isr.) ("The Minister [of Trade and Industry] shall designate five members [of
the Exemptions and Mergers Advisory Committee] who shall be civil servants possessing
expertise and knowledge in economics. accountancy, business administration or law ...
and eight members who shall be representatives of the public, among whon-(1) Four
members shall be highly reputed researchers and teachers in the Committee's fields of
expertise; (2) Four shall be members of the general public possessing academic degrees
in the Committees ficlds of expertise, and having knowledge and experience of at least
seven years in the above mentioned fields.").
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This research design quickly proved impractical. As it turns
out, very few courts have opined at all on these issues; more have
dealt with claims of predation, but they are mostly courts within
the European Union, which are bound to follow the rulings of
the European Court of Justice, so there were in fact too few data
points and still fewer variations among them for one to identify
empirical relationships between court design and economic
sophistication or any other measure of performance. In part, the
paucity of data reflects the short time since many NCAs were
established or since a specialist tribunal was created to review
the decisions of a pre-existing NCA. Also, courts in civil law
jurisdictions only rarely cite non-legal sources, such as economic
literature, which further complicates the task of evaluating the
justification for their decisions. To the common law competition
lawyer, the decisions of civil law courts may seem somewhat
wooden because they are couched in purely legal terms which
obscure the degree to which the court was exposed to and
understood economic arguments for interpreting the law one
way or another.
With our preferred research path blocked, we were
remitted to evaluating the case for specialist versus generalist
tribunals by reference to criteria that have been widely accepted
in the legal and political science literature evaluating actual or
proposed specialized courts, 10 and applying those criteria to the
particular context of antitrust cases. While there is no shortage
of passing references in favor of (or against) specialized antitrust
tribunals without analysis of the costs and benefits of
specialization, the only more extended effort specific to antitrust
seems to be a one-page passage in Judge Richard Posner's book
on the federal courts," using antitrust as an example in a
chapter critical of judicial specialization generally, and a
paragraph devoted to antitrust as an example of the perils of
specialization in an article by Judge Diane Wood.12
10. For a greater discussion, see LAWRLNCE BAUM. SPECIALIZING THE COURTS
(2011) and the extensive bibliograph at pp. 231-71.
11. RICHARD A. POSNER. THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND RLEORM 251
(1996) [hereinafter POSNER, CHALLENGE AND REFORM]; RICHARD A. POSNER. THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 151-52 (1985) [hereinafter POSNER, CRISTS AND
REFORM].

12. Diane P. Wood, GeneralistJudgesin a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755,
1767 (1997).
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The conventionally claimed benefits of specialized courts
go to their potential efficiency, subject matter expertise, and, if

they are given a monopoly over the subject matter, uniformity of
decisions. All these benefits are somewhat speculative and
therefore debatable. In this context, (1) efficiency typically
refers to increasing the court's outputs for any given level of
inputs, holding constant the quality of the outputs. (2) Subject
matter expertise refers to the quality of judicial outputs, which is
subjective and difficult to measure; expert judges might increase
or decrease the quality of judicial outputs.13 (3) Uniformity
means simply consistency in the law. Because these three
putative virtues of specialization need not correlate with
ideological shifts in substantive policy, they are sometimes
referred to in the literature as the "neutral virtues."14 We
consider each with particular attention to how it might apply to
antitrust cases.
1. EFFICIENCY
Keeping in mind the distinction between efficiency and
expertise is difficult but important. When we refer to a tribunal's
efficiency, we are holding constant the level of its expertise. In
this context, efficiency is an objective function measuring the
rate at which judicial outputs are produced from inputs.
The argument that a specialist tribunal is more efficient for
handling any particular type of case, although speculative, has
an undeniable appeal. In the more than two centuries since
Adam Smith pointed out that the division of labor makes a
factory more efficient and the one century since Henry Ford
13. See BAUNI, supra note 10, at 33 ([E]xpcrtisc is not parallel with efficiency.
Enhanced eiciency is an outcome, but expertise is a trait that might affect
outcomes."). For an argument that appeal and reversal ratCs provide a valuabic, if
imperfect, signal of the quality of first instance decisions in antitrust cases, see Michael
R. Baye & Joshua ). Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?: The Impact
ofEcononic Com.plexit andJudicial Training on Appeals. 54J.L. & EcON. 1 (2011) (linding

judicial training in

economics reduces the ratC of appeals taken and judgments reversed

in a subset of relatively simple antitrust cases). kso, see StephenJ. Choi, Mit Gulati &
Eric A. Posner, How Well Do Measures of Ability PredictJudicialPerfornance?:A Case Study
Using Securities Class Actions (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research, Paper No. 10-18, 2011),
available
at
http://scholarship.1aw.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontetnt.cgiarticle=3001&
contcxt facult yscholarship (discussing various measures of the quality of judicial
output, including appeal and reversal rates).
14. BAUM, supra note 10, at 32-34.
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brought the point home, it has become common to assume that,
ceteris paribus, the cost of production declines with specialization.
Although many specialized courts have been created over that
period, there is still no empirical foundation for the proposition
that specialist judges are more efficient than generalists in the
production of judgments.15 Even as simplistic a metric as the
time it takes for a specialist versus a generalist court to dispose of
comparable claims remains undocumented.
With respect to a specialist court for the trial or appeal of
antitrust cases, we do think it reasonable to believe that a judge
with experience in the subject matter will be quicker to
recognize a claim that should be dismissed early on or an
argument on appeal that can quickly be put to the sword. An
experienced antitrust specialist should be more able than a
generalist to do such early triage because the judge's experience
with prior cases that should not have gone to trial or should
have been summarily affirmed on appeal will inform his or her
view of the pleadings and evidentiary proffers in later cases.
This point is of some relevance to any particular field of the law,
but probably has more heft as applied to antitrust than to most
fields because economic evidence is central to the merits of
almost all antitrust cases. The ability early on to spot a gap in
either a party's economic reasoning or its factual allegations is
surely improved by frequent exposure to recurring economic
issues. The learning curve may be fairly steep, even for antitrust
cases, but the generalist judge who sees one antitrust case every
year or two would surely be slower to progress down that curve
than would the judge who sees such cases weekly.
Efficiency specifically in reviewing the decisions of an NCA
is also likely increased by accumulating experience. Ajudge who
reviews the decisions of an administrative agency that regulates a
15. See id. at 218 ([E]fficiency
is the virtue most closely associated with
specialization ... but there is little evidence on this issue.").
16. See William W. Schwarzer, Techniques for Identifing and Narrowing Issues in
Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 223 (1982) ("[I] t's critical at the outset to try to
get the issues identified clearly ... in plain English: .. . what specific conduct is plaintiff
complaining about; what is the agreement which is the source of the litigation; who are
supposed to have been the parties to it: what was its effect: what are the products that
are affected [etc.] ....
In particular, I think it's important to address very early in the
Context of issue clarification what relief is sought in the case, what is the theory of
damages, whether thie plaintiff has a viable theory of damages, and whether there is

meaningful relief available at the end of the litigation.")
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complex field of economic activity, whether sectoral or, as with
antitrust, economy-wide, becomes familiar with the regulatory

scheme overall and sees more quickly how a case fits into the
relevant statutory framework or body of precedent.
Consequently, the judge comes to see quickly whether a new
case presents a serious issue or can be disposed of summarily
upon the basis of cases he or she has studied many times before
and need not read again before entering judgment.1
The potential gains in efficiency from a specialist tribunal
must necessarily be evaluated by comparison with the efficiency
of the alternative, a generalist court. In the United States, the
federal courts of appeal have issued on average around forty
antitrust opinions per year over the last decade. Over that same
period the Supreme Court has issued on average barely more
than one antitrust opinion per year. Keeping up with the case
developments therefore is not impossible for the generalist
judge with a special interest in the subject; presumably doing so
would be quite practical for a judge in a specialist tribunal. At
bottom, therefore, we think a specialist tribunal would be more
efficient in processing antitrust cases, perhaps particularly in the
first instance, where case management can be most expedited by
ajudge knowledgeable about the subject.
II. UNTFORMITY
If a single judge in a court of first instance or a single court
of appeals has a monopoly on a type of case, then there is no
possibility that the outcome of a particular case depends upon
"the luck of the draw," referring here to the judges to whom the
case is assigned. The monopoly also facilitates business planning
and precludes forum shopping.1 At the trial level, however, no

one judge could possibly hear all the antitrust cases filed in a
jurisdiction that allows private antitrust suits or requires its NCA
17. Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does not
see many antitrust cases, one authoi's personal experience is that involvement with the
subject matter through teaching and writing keeps a judge familiar with the cases cited
in the occasional antitrust brief. With a degree of judicial specialization he might
actually get to the point where prudence does not require him to re-read all the cases
counsel cite when an antitrust case does come along.
18. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 AD\MIN. L.
RLx. 329, 331 (1991) ("A pattern of conflicting court orders, uncertainty about the law,
and forum shopping has traditionally led to the establishment of specialized courts.").
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to bring enforcement cases to a court of first instance, as the US
Department of Justice must do.19 A multiplicity of trial judges is
therefore inevitable.
Non-uniformity of the decisions made in the first instance
may be eliminated retrospectively by a court of appeals with a
monopoly over review of first instance or higher judgments.20 If
more than one panel of that court is required in order to handle
the volume of cases, however, it may be necessary on occasion to
coordinate their decisions in order to avoid disuniformity at the
appellate level. A common solution is to provide for rehearing
of a panel's decisions before the full court, as is done in most of
the US Circuit Courts of Appeals or before a panel intermediate
in size between the full court and a regular panel, as is done in
the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (with eleven of the
twenty-nine judges sitting), where the full court would be too
large efficiently to coordinate the decisional process and the
deployment of so many judges would, in any event, be a waste of
resources. Absent a court with a monopoly over appeals, and a
concomitant degree of specialization, the resolution of conflicts
between courts and the restoration of unity in the law must fall
to a higher and typically a generalist court-often the national
supreme court:' Alternatively, concentrating all cases of a
particular type in a single appellate forum eliminates the
potential for disuniformity and conserves the resources of the
higher court for review of the most important issues rather than
the resolution of conflicts among the lower courts.

19. There were 475 antitrust cases filed in federal district courts over the twvelve
month period ending September 30, 2011. SeeAOUS, supra note 2, thl. C-2. More than
1,000 cases were filed as recently as five years ago. See id. tbl. C-2A.
20. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") can maintain the uniformity of EU
antitrust law by reviewing the decisions of the highest national courts with antitrust

jurisdiction. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 267, 2010 0.J. C 83/47, at 164 [hereinafter TFEU], or by reference from the
General Court "where there is a scrious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law
being affected." Id. art. 256 (2), at 159.
21. In the ECJ a case may be assigned to a panel of three or of fivejudges, or to a
Grand Chamber (comprising fifteen of the twenty-seven judges), depending upon the
"difficulty or importance of the case." Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, art.
60(1), 2012 O.J. L 265/1, at 20. If the courts of two member states issued apparently
conflicting judgmcns, the E(J might refer the case to a Grand Chamber at the request
either of a Member State or of the Comminission. Id.: Protocol on the Statute of the

Court ofJustice of the European Union, art. 16, 2004 0.J. C 310/2 10, at 213.
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Achieving uniformity without resort to the highest court is
not entirely costless. As Judge Posner has pointed out, an
appellate court with a monopoly over a subject matter deprives
the supreme court of "the benefit of competing judicial answers
to choose among when deciding questions within the domain of
the specialized court."2 That is true, of course: a monopoly
means the absence of competition-at least in a jurisdiction
where the courts do not publish dissenting opinions, which also
provide competing judicial answers. But is the absence of
competition among courts significant?
In the last decade, two of the twelve antitrust cases decided
by the US Supreme Court (seventeen percent) arose from the
need to resolve a conflict between courts of appeals.23 In the
other ten cases (eighty-three percent), the Court lacked
competing judicial answers from which to choose but still had
the benefit of adversarial presentations in the briefs of the
parties and of amici curiae presenting alternative arguments and
rationales for a decision. Therefore, while neither disputing the
marginal benefit to be had from "competing judicial answers"
because they are proffered by disinterested judges, nor jumping
to the conclusion that a specialist court with a monopoly over
appeals below the highest court is what every jurisdiction needs,
we think the advantages of uniformity outweigh the drawback
hypothesized by Judge Posner. There are, however, other
weightier drawbacks to be considered before concluding a
specialist tribunal is a superior forum, as he and others have
emphasized.
111. EXPERTISE
In determining whether a specialist tribunal is likely to

bring greater expertise to its decision-making, one should
distinguish between technical facility and the substantive change
in the law that may ensue from having specialists with
established views deciding cases. By technical facility we mean
the substantively neutral improvement in the quality of
22. POSNLR. CRISIS AND REFOIRM, supra notc 11, at 155-56.
23. In seven of the twelve cases, the party seeking discretionary review argued not
only the importance of the issue but also that there was a conflict among the courts of
appeal; in only two opinions. however, did the Court Cite the conflict as its reason for
hearing the case.
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decisions, as reflected in their clarity and logical rigor, as distinct
from their ultimate result. An expert in antitrust likely will bring
to bear a more accurate and a more sophisticated use of the
specialized legal terminology and economic concepts unique to
antitrust cases than would a generalist.
There appears to be broad support within the US antitrust
bar for the view that generalist courts suffer from their lack of
antitrust expertise. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar
Association created a Task Force on Economic Evidence
comprising prominent antitrust economists, lawyers, and
academics, and a federal trial judge, to study the role of
economic evidence in federal court. 4 The Task Force reached
consensus on the proposition that "it is critical that judges and
juries understand economic issues and economic testimony in
order to reach sound decisions" and that "these problems can
seriously affect the adversarial process by skewing judicial
outcomes, by leading decision makers to ignore conflicting
economic testimony or come to 'wrong' conclusions, and can
increase litigation costs." 25 The Task Force's survey of forty-two
antitrust economists revealed that only twenty-four percent
believe judges "usually" understand the economic issues in a
case.26 Similar views are shared in other jurisdictions, as the
International Competition Network found in a survey of
competition authorities in seven countries, noting that "all
countries but one reaffirm that lack of specialized knowledge on

competition issues by the judiciary is an important issue affecting
competition policy implementation."27 The debate over an

24. Memorandum from Jonathan B. Baker & M. Howard Morse, Co-chairs, Econ.
Evidence Task Force, Final Report of Econ. Evidence Task Force to Officers and

Council
25.
26.
27.

2 (Aug. 1, 2006).
Id.
Id.
INT'l COMPETITION

NETWORK,

COMPETITION AND

THE JUDICIARY: 2ND

PHASE-CASE STUDIES 17 (2007) ("At least for developing countries, such statement
showed to be the most important worry . . . ."). The six NCAs of this view were Brazil,

Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, and Turkey. The Brazilian competition authority
has also advocated the creation of a specialized court for antitrust or more broadly
econonic law in Brazil, mostly due to the recurring efforts and delay entailed in
educatingjudges about antitrust law each time a case is filed. See OECD AND INTER-MAN
DEV. BANK. COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMLRICA: PLER RLVILWS OF
ARGENTINA. BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXI.CO AND PLRU 163 (2005); see also Michael S. Gal, When

the Going Gets Tight: Intitu

a S,olution

whet Antitrut Enforcenent Resources Are Scarce,
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expansive interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission's
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit "unfair
methods of competition" also hinges upon whether the
Commission's expertise renders it better situated than are
generalist courts to evaluate the economic evidence that plays so
large a role in modern antitrust cases: At the same time, a
specialist will have-either prior to or after becoming a judge-a
particular outlook on substantive antitrust issues that may affect
how he or she resolves an issue that another specialist with equal
technical facility might have resolved differently. To the extent
that any field of law is contested by different schools of thought,
the selection of an established specialist to become a judge on a
specialist tribunal will be more controversial than is the
appointment of a judge to a court of general jurisdiction
because special interest groups will have more at stake.
In recent decades, improvements in empirical economics
and the increased diffusion of technical economic skills among
both theorists and practitioners have narrowed the gap between
schools of antitrust thinking.2 For example, there is now
41 Lo. U. CHI. Lj. 417. 428 (2011) (discussing specialized tribunals as a way to "bypass
incompetent courts").

28. 1.Thomas Rosch, Coinm'r, Fed. Trade Conn'n, Renaks before te New York
State Bar Assoaton ArmualAntitrust Conference: The Great Doctrinal Debate: Under What
Circumstances is Section 5 Superior to Section 2?, 2 (Jan. 27, 2011) (transcript available
at htp: /www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/110127barspeech.pdf
) (advocating enlargement
of the scope of conduct within the condemnation of "unfair methods of competition"
in Section 5 of the FTC Act); id. at 14 ("The problem [with generalist judges] is that
they're not required to be experts in antitrust law."); see also Daniel A. Crane, Reflections
on Section 5 ofthe FTCAct and the FTCs Case Against Intel 18 (Jan. 19, 2010) (transcript
available at http://download.intel.com/pressroom/legli/ftc/Crane Section 5Paper.pdl)
(arguing courts are "more likely to trust an agency's prediction based on its superior
familiarity with the type of conduct at issue"); Tad Lipsky, Remarks at the Workshop on
Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute, 189 (Oct. 17, 2008) (transcript
available at htp://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf ) ("The entire
reason that agency interpretations receive any deference is that specialized agencies are
presumed to have greater subject matter expertise than generalist judges.").
29. Judge Posner observed the convergence between the Chicago and Harvard
Schools more than three decades ago. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School
ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); see also William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern US. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The
Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. RE. 1 (2007) (noting shared
contribution of the Chicago and Harvard Schools to modern monopolization law).
Modern debates over antitrust policy are more likely to appeal to empirical tests of
competing theories. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy A Century of
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 58-59 (2000) ("The availability of
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widespread agreement about the pernicious effects of cartels
upon consumer welfare,so the diminished relevance of market
definition and market structure in inferring competitive
effects,' and the proposition that resale price maintenance is
more often than not efficient." Still, there remain areas in
which fundamentally different views can affect the outcome of a
case: How likely are exclusionary practices to harm competition?
Is price predation a significant threat in view of the likelihood of
entry? Does the promise of acquiring static market power lead to
more rapid innovation? Because there are such important issues
over which reasonable judges may disagree, a specialist court,
for all its expertise, may be or at least appear to be more subject
to political influences (as explained below) than is a generalist
court.
A. Selection Bias
In the case of a specialist antitrust tribunal, the groups with
the most at stake will be the NCA itself and the organized
new data sources like electronic point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible
ganic-theorctic

models.

and the new emphasis on innovation

assures that robust

arguments over the proper content of competition policy will flourish into the 21st
century.").
30. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMLNDATIONS\

vii

(2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu /amc/report recommendation/
amc finalreport.pdf ("There is a strong consensus worldwide favoring vigorous
enforcement against cartels. Cartels offer no benefit to society and invariably harm
consumers.").
31. See U.S.

DEP'T OF

JUSTICE

& FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER

GUIDELINES 7 (2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/guide lines/hmg2010.pdf ("The measurement of market shares and market concentration is not an end
in itsclf. but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger's likely competitive
effects."); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 HorizontalMerger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in
Forty 1ars, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 717 (2010) ("As economic learning and practice
evolved, the emphasis on market shares found in Section 2.21 of the 1992 Guidelines
became less helpful to achieve transparent and accurate merger enforcement . . . .").
32. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem oJ Infternce, 23
INL'J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005) (reviewing twenty-four empirical papers on vertical
restraints including resale price maintenance ("RPM") and concluding "virtually no
studies can claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have
harmed competition"); see also Daniel P. O'Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical
Restraints: Beyond the Possibilit Theorems, in THE PROS AND CONS OF VLRTI(AL RLSTRAINTS

40, 76 (Konkurrenserket, Swedish Competition Authority, 2008) ("With few
exceptions, the literature does not support the view that these practices are used for
arnticomlpetitive reasons. This literaLure supports a fairly strong prior belief that these

practices are unlikely to be anti-competitive in most cases.").
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antitrust bar that practices before the NCA or the specialist
court that reviews decisions of the NCA. The interested parties
might also include consumer organizations and various
confederations of business, both general and those specific to
industries facing frequent antitrust claims. None of these
interest groups ordinarily speaks out for or against the
appointment of a judge to a generalist court.
Although it is reasonable to expect special interests to try to
influence the selection of specialist judges, evidence of their
efforts is hard to come by because their influence ordinarily
must be exerted through private channels to the government
officials who will make or block the appointment. An interested
party-particularly the NCA and the antitrust bar-would not
publicly oppose a possible appointee lest its effort fail and it
must then appear in court before the new judge; indeed, an
interested party might not even voice its support in public lest its
favorable comments tend to undermine the expectation that the
potential judge will be unbiased in deciding cases of concern to
it.
The need for access to political officials inevitably gives an
advantage to the NCA as an arm of the government. Even if the
NCA is independent as, for example, the South African
Competition Tribunal appears to be," the government of the
day will be concerned that its policies, as expressed either to or
by the NCA, are not thwarted upon review in court. There is at
least some evidence that specialist tribunals, often established to
hear a type of case in which the government is usually a party,
are more favorable to the government's interests than
are generalist courts.34 This bias may be less pronounced in a
33. See, e.g:, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. & Massmart Holdings Ltd., Case No.
73/LM/Dccl(0 (S. Ar. Comrpetition Trib. June 29, 2011) (statement of reasons rejecting
tcstimnony of expert witnesscs for three government ministries that had intervened in

the appeal from the decision of the Commission).
34. See BAUM, supra note 10, at 39 ("Where judicial specialization increases the
incentives and oppo rtunities to influence what courts do, governments are in an
especially good position to benelit as a result."). See. e.g., Richard L Revesz, Specialized
Courts and the Admninistrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REx. 1111, 1152-53 (1990)
(arguing specialized courts charged with reviewing decisions of administrative agencies
are likely to be biased in favor of the agency). But see James Edward Maule, Instant
Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax CourtJudge Bias,
66 TENN. L. RL.

taxpayers).

351 (1999) (finding the Tax Court is not systematically biased against
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jurisdiction where there are many private antitrust suits-as in
the United States, where the NCAs bring fewer than twenty-five
percent of all antitrust cases"-but in the great majority of
jurisdictions there are few or no private antitrust actions. To the
extent that courts reviewing administrative decisions already
indulge the government agency with a lenient standard of
review and place the burden of persuasion upon the regulated
party, any additional bias in favor of the NCA would deprive the
public of a meaningful check upon the agency." Unless this
potential for pro-government bias can be avoided, as we suggest
in Part IV that it can be, a specialized antitrust court does not
seem to be an attractive proposition.
B. Loss of Perspective
Once appointed a specialist judge would be subject to
continuing influence from both the NCA, as a repeat player in
the judge's court, and from the antitrust bar. The NCA, by
constant appearance before the court, will be in a position to
gain the confidence of the judges; a repeat litigant has the
greater incentive to avoid misleading the court in order to avoid
reputational penalties and the judges will come to know they
can rely upon the agency's integrity; it would not be surprising if
that affected the court's judgment that the NCA acted
"reasonably" in finding the facts, interpreting the law, and
exercising its remedial discretion. Only the private lawyers who
appear in court most frequently would have anything close to
the same opportunity to gain the confidence of the court. The
specialist bar as a group will have some opportunities to make a
favorable impression by including the judge as a speaker at their

35. Bonny E. Sweeney, Defining Antitrust iotions in the U nited States, in PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTIRusT LAW IN THE UNITL) STATES: A HANDBOOK 14, 15 n.3 (Albert

A. Foer & Randy M. Stutz eds. 2012).
36.

Cf

CONGRESS,

CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL RLVIW: INTEREST GROUPS
AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 94-95 (1997) (describing broadcaster

interest groups' preference for locatingjudicial review of the Federal Communications
Commission exclusively in the DC Circuit despite their perception the court often
favored tie agency, in order to reduce legal uncertainty and to raise the costs of appeal

to less wealthy rivals).
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events and programs, but it is not clear whether the influence of
"[a]gencies and their opponents" will predominate.
There is another likely source of bias, more subtle than that
arising from the appointment or cultivation of judges, that may
with the passage of time affect even the most neutral appointee:
judges, perhaps more than most people, would like to think the
work they do is important beyond the salary it brings them. A
judge newly appointed to a specialist antitrust court might
conceivably think it important to confine the scope of antitrust
law at every turn, but it is more reasonable to expect all but the
most curmudgeonly judge will believe, or will come to believe,
antitrust is a worthwhile project, to be preserved and perfected,
even if the NCA must occasionally be reminded of its limitations.
The more typical judge specializing in antitrust will likely take
an expansive view of the subject, one that will bring to the court
a continuous flow of interesting, "cutting edge" issues-and an
edge cuts only when it is moving forward.
There is also a plausible concern that specialists are
inherently less desirable than generalist judges precisely because
of their expertise. Whereas the specialist brings to the court a
depth of knowledge about the subject that enables the judge
immediately to place a new issue in its evolutionary context and
hence to grasp its significance beyond the case at handespecially in the more path-dependent common lawgeneralists by definition have a breadth of experience upon
which to draw. Judge Wood makes the point specific to antitrust:
If one never emerges from the world of antitrust, to take

one field that I know well, one can lose sight of the broader
goals that lie behind this area of law; one can forget the ways
in which it relates to other fields of law like business torts,
breaches of contract, and consumer protection, and more
broadly the way this law fits into the loose "industrial policy"
of the United States . . . . Specialists need to emerge from

their cocoons from time to time and find out how their
smaller world fits in with the larger one.38

37. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantie Policy:
The Court of Custonms and Pte Appeats, 11 L. & Soc'Y REV. 823, 833 (1977); cf Revs,,
supra note 34, at 1152 (" [W]here the Department [of Justice] faces a strong private
bar ... [its influence upon the selection of judges] will be considerably mnitigaLed.").
38. See Wood, supra note 12, at 1767.
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Indeed, exposure to other areas of the law may give the
generalist insights unavailable to a specialist but nonetheless
helpful in penetrating an argument or seeing an issue in a
broader context, perhaps one that implicates limitations upon
government institutions. If, for example, sectoral regulators
display certain systematic biases, such as excessive risk aversion
or a tendency toward mission creep, so too may competition
authorities, but that would be less likely apparent to the judge
who sees only the handiwork of the NCA (or of any other single
agency). Thus, replacing a generalist court with a specialized
court may entail trading a lower rate of error for a higher
degree of bias, as illustrated below:
Illustration 1

~~ ........

r.1

-

-

-

-

Generalist Court with wide variability
and thus greater total error in
doctrinal development. and little to noI
bias.
Specialist Court with fewer errors in
doctrinal developmntl but mnore bias

Historically, special courts have been proposed for the
purpose of removing from the courts of general jurisdiction the
burden associated with some type of case that is heard in large
numbers but is typically rather simple; claims for social security
benefits are a recent example.39 The purpose of this type of
proposal is to free up the resources of the generalist courts so
39. See, e.g., Paul R Ve1rkuil Sc Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to
Review of Social Secutrity DbLit Cases, 55 AD)MIN. L. REV. 731 (2003) .

judicial

2013] ANTITRUST COURTS: SPECIALISTS VS. GENERALISTS 805
they can devote more time to each of their remaining cases,
4 Judge
which present more complicated factual or legal issues."
Posner objects that the caseload of any specialized court is going
to be more volatile than that of a court with broad jurisdiction,
making it more difficult to match the supply of and demand for
judicial services.4 l There is indeed a fair amount of volatility
from year to year in the number of antitrust filings in US
courts42 and, most likely, in the output of most NCAs. The point
is that when the docket of a specialized court is growing, it will
not have an adequate number of judges, and getting newjudges
is difficult, time consuming, and imprudent in light of the
probability that the caseload will soon turn down again. When
the court's caseload is declining, the specialist court would have
excess capacity.43
As an additional objection, we note that creating a specialist
court is likely to raise some difficult boundary questions as to
where a particular case should have been brought. Such a
boundary problem may arise whenever there is a specialist court
the subject matter of which may arise also in a court of general
jurisdiction, for instance, as a defense to an action that could
not have been brought in the specialist court. This occurs
routinely in jurisdictions where there is a special constitutional
court; a case brought in the court of general jurisdiction and
met with a constitutional defense must be halted and either the
40. See, e.g., An Address byJusticeAntonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, 34 FED.
B. NFWS &J. 252 (1987).
41. See POSNER, CHALLENGE AND

REFORM supra note

1, at 259-60 ("It is a

mathematical law that the federal appellate caseload as a whole changes less fron year
to year than the components of that caseload. So if each component were assigned to a
separate court it would be harder to match supply to demand.").
42. In the five year period ending March 31, 2011, the number of civil antitrust
suits filed in US federal district courts has ranged from a low of 555 in the year ending
March 31, 2011, to a high of 1.165 in the year ending March 31. 2007. See AOUS, supra
note 2, tIb. C-2 (2011); FederalJudicialCaseload Statistics-MVarch 31, 2007, AWMIN. OFFICL
OF THE U.S. COU RTS, tbl. C-2 (2007), available at http:/,/w.uscourts.gov/u/scourts/
Statistics/Fcderaludicial(,aseloadStatistics/2007/tables/(O2Mar07.pdf.
43. In the United States, the temporary reassignment of federal judges to match
supply with demand is addressed by 28 U.S.C.
291 (a), 292(a) (1982), which
authorize the ChiefJustice and the chict
of the courts of appeals to assign circuit
and district judges respectively to sit with a different federal court "in the public
interest" and "whenever the business of that court so requires." In each of the last
several years, judges of the specialist Federal Circuit have served occasionally with

judges

generalist courts; those judges are to that degree less specialized than would appear

from the statutorily prescribed

jurisdiction of their court.
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entire case or more usually the constitutional issue must be
referred to the constitutional court for resolution and
potentially then returned to the original forum for further
proceedings. 44 Vhere there is a special court for the review of
antitrust cases and another special court for the resolution of
intellectual property disputes, as there now is in Portugal, the
boundary problem might arise when the defendant in the
antitrust matter interposes its patent as a defense to antitrust
liability;5 similarly, a contract or other action brought in a court
of general jurisdiction may be met with an antitrust defense.46
To the extent that antitrust and patent issues arise in the same
litigation, the boundary problem could be mitigated by
legislation assigning both those subjects to a single semi44. See, e.g., William Burnharn & Alexei Trochev, Russial War Between the Courts: The
Struggle over the JurisdictionalBoundar Between the Constitutional Court and the Regular
Courts, 55 AM. J. COmP. L. 381 (2007): Lech Garlicki. Constitutional Courts 1rsus Supreme
Courts, 5 INT'L J CON. L. 44, 64 (2007) (Germany, Italy and Poland); Leslie Turano,
Spain: Quis Custodiet 1psos Custodes?: The Struggle for Jurisdiction Between the Tribunal
Constitucionaland the Tribunal Supremo, 4 INT'L.J. CON. L. 151 (2006) (Spain); John H.
Merrnman & Vincenzo Vigoriti, 1When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Ital, 15
AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1967) (Italy); TOM GINSBURG, jLUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEw
DEMOCRACILS: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN EAST AsiA (2003) (Korca and Taiwan);
RADOSLAkV PROCHAZKA, MISSION ACCOMPI iSHED: ON FOUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE 159-67 (2002) (Czech Republic); Renate Weber,
The Romanian Constitutional Court: In Search of its Own Identity, in CONSTITUTIONAL
jU STICE, EAST AND WEST 283-308 (Wojciech Sadurski ed. 2002) (Romania); jiri Priban,
Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: The Culture of Constitutionalism and Human
Rights in the Czech Legal Syste, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WLST 373, 37394 (Woiciech Sadurski ed. 2002) (Czech Republic); Andrej Skolkay, Slovakia: Interview

with Jan Drgonec,Justice of ConstitutionalCourt of the Slovak Republic, 6 E. EUR. CONST. REV.
89 (1997) (Slovakia); Heive Bribosia, Report on Belgium, in THL EUROPLAN COURTS &
NATIONAlCOURTS-DOCTRINE ANDJURISPRUDENCF 3-39 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al.
eds. 1998) (Belgium).
45. The Supreme Court of the United States has twice clarified the boundary of

the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. See Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (holding appeals involving patent
defenses to non-patent claims do not ipso facto fall within the Federal Circuit's
exclusive jurisdiction); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002) (same for counterclaims). These cases suggest that legislation

creating a specialist jurisdiction can give rise to boundary problems that require
multiple decisions by the court of last resort before each party may know in which court
it must bring or appeal a particular claim.
46. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1959) (describing the "narrow
scope" of antitrust illegality as a defense to breach of contract claim based upon
principle of "preventing peoplc from getting other peopl's property for nothing when
they purport to be buying it.'

(quoting ConI'l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis VoiglL & Sons

Co., 212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (Holmes,.J., dissenting)).
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specialized court, which would then be able to work out the
relationship between patent and antitrust law as applied in
particular cases.47 There would still be contract actions met by
an antitrust defense, so the problem of an antitrust issue arising
in a court of general jurisdiction would persist at least to that
extent.
IV. SYNTHESIS
To review, the principle drawbacks associated with a
specialized competition court are two. First, the selection of
judges for the specialist tribunal may be unduly influenced by
one or another interest group, such as the NCA or the defense
bar, each seeking to turn the specialized court into a friendly
forum for its recurring arguments. The efforts of those
contending interest groups may offset one another and leave the
court free of their influence, but there is undeniably the
potential for regulatory capture through influence over the
selection of judges and, to a lesser extent, over their conduct
once appointed.
Second, specialization in antitrust risks losing the broad
perspective attributed to the generalist judge, who approaches
his occasional antitrust case informed by knowledge of other
areas of the law, which knowledge can be useful, whether by
analogy or by contrast, to improve the resolution of an antitrust
issue. This claimed drawback is difficult to document but seems
plausible, indeed likely; the remaining question is whether
sparks jump from one field of law to another, as the generalist
judge moves across subject matters, frequently enough to
warrant sacrificing the greater depth a specialist brings to the
adjudication of antitrust cases.
47. Cf Jamtes B. Gambrell, The Evolving lnterplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust
Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TFX. INTELL. PROP. 1.j. 137, 156 (2001) (arguing the
Federal Circuit "clevates patent rights at the expense of unfair competition and core
antitrust principles that it was not given the jurisdiction to control"); Peter M. Boyle,
Penelope M. Lister &J. Clayton Everett, jr., Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light
or Green Light at the IP-AntitrustIntersection? 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 741 (2001) (noting
the Federal Circuit's "antitrustopinions ... often contain imprecise or misguided dicta,
including language suggesting that patent owners enjoy such broad immunity from
antitrust scrutiny that they will scidon face antitrust liability . . . [which among other]
deficiencies

ha[s]

the

potential

to

mnisliad

lower

courts and

to

circumscribe

unreasonably an intellectual property owner's exposure to antitrustliability").
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We believe the drawbacks associated with having a specialist
court for the resolution of antitrust cases can be mooted,
perhaps entirely, by proper institutional design: The specialist
court should be staffed by judges drawn from generalist courts,
temporarily and only to the extent needed. This simple solution
has been used before in other countries, such as the United
Kingdom (Competition Appeals Tribunal) and Canada
(Competition Tribunal), and in the United States when
circumstances called for the creation of a special court and the
President or the Congress or both were concerned that the
court not be captured by any special interest nor come to
identify unduly with one or another repeat litigant. Examples
include the short-lived Commerce Court,48 the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals, 9 the Federal Circuit,5o which is
semi-specialized in intellectual property (patent and trademark)
law, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
associated special Court of Appeals.)'
In the US examples, the selection of the particular judges
to serve on the specialist court was left to the Chief Justice,
sometimes providing the appointment would be for a fixed term
and prohibiting reappointment.5 In this way, generalist judges
who had accumulated experience with the range of matters that
come to a federal court would spend the plurality if not the
majority of their time upon a single type of case, after which
they would return full time to their previous role. The result
should be to benefit the specialist court with the insights
48. Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (June 18, 1910) (establishing the C ommerce
Court); see Urgent DeiciencyAct, 38 Stat. 208 (Oct. 22, 1913) (abolishing the court).
49. Act of December 22. 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-210 (1971).
50. Federal Courts Improvenent Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Remarks, 10 GEORGETOWNJ.L. & PUB. P0L'Y 1, 3 (2012) ("[T]he D.C. Circuit has
become a relatively specialized court in the area of administrative law.").
50. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L 95-511 (1978). See
generally Rochelle Cooper Drcyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.YU. L. RE. 1 (1989); see also Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 3 ("[T]he D.C. Circuit
has become a relatively specialized court in the area of administrative law.").
51. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511
(1978).
52. The statute creating the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals provides for
indefinite, rathier than fixed, terins. Judges appointed to the FISA court and the
associated Court of Appeals have fixed seven year terms, and no judge may be reappointed.
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brought by a generalist judge who, while acquiring expertise in
the subject matter of the specialist court, would not come under
the influence of any party to the particular legal subculture of
that specialty.
By deputing the ChiefJustice to choose generalist judges to
serve on the specialist court for a limited time, the problem of
parties trying to exert pressure upon the selection of a specialist
judge would essentially disappear. Judges would continue to be
selected for their qualifications as generalists, and the slight
chance that a particular prospective judge might in the future
be brought into service on the specialist court would be
insufficient reason to expend resources to further or oppose his
selection and confirmation to a court of general jurisdiction.
During the time of the judge's incumbency on the specialist
court, there would no doubt be efforts by the NCA and the
organized bar to ingratiate themselves with the judge, but the
limited term of special service and the certainty of returning full
time to a court of general jurisdiction would both mitigate the
judge's susceptibility to influence in the short run and diminish
the return, and therefore the supply, of parties' efforts to
influence the judge during his sojourn on the specialist court.
This institutional arrangement would also overcome the
objection based upon the greater degree of volatility in the
caseload of a specialized court. The Chief Justice could appoint
more judges as the special court's docket grew, and could
refrain from filling vacancies as that court's docket moved into a
phase of contraction. Indeed, in a slack period judges would
simply sit more in the "home" courts.
The expertise of specialist judges chosen in this way from a
pool of generalist judges would not, particularly at the outset of
their service, be as well developed as that of a lawyer who comes
to the bench after some years of having practiced antitrust law,
whether as a lawyer for the NCA or for private parties on the
other side of the NCA's cases. Even supposing, however, that it
53. The minor objection (not discussed above) that the specialist court might not
attract judges as able as those who sit on the geniralist courts, see POSNLR, CHALLENGL
AND RLFORv, supra note 11. at 99-100; Revez, supra note 34. at 1154, n.173-74 (1990),
would of course be moot as well. The prospect of possibly being asked, or even
required, to sit on the specialist court for a period of years would hardly act as a
disincentive for a lawyer who would ot-herwise welcome being sected as a generalist

judge.
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takes two or three years to achieve the level of expertise that a
seasoned practitioner would bring to bear in year one, the result
would still elevate considerably the average degree of expertise
on a panel of three appellate judges. A trial judge hearing solely
antitrust cases would likely adapt even more quickly and would
of course be subject to correction by a still more expert court of
review. Unlike specialists chosen solely to serve on a specialist
court for a term by the time he leaves the court, will be wholly
concentrated in a single field, in which he must engage for the
remainder of his career if he is to maximize his post-judicial
earnings. The inevitability of going (or returning) to a
specialized practice after serving on the bench may well affect
the specialist judge's perspective and consequently his views on
substantive legal issues while still on the court. Such a judge will
not want to alienate the private bar to which he might look for
later employment; nor would he want to make rulings that
impair the opportunities open to lawyers practicing in that field.
Limiting the types of actions that may be brought, or the
damages that may be recovered, or otherwise constraining the
rewards for lawyers in his special field of practice would be a
career-ending move. Not so for the judge of a specialist court
who will be going on not to the specialized practice of law but
rather to the generalist court from which he came.
CONCLUSION
The careful reader will have noticed that we make no
recommendation for or against the use of specialist courts for
antitrust cases where they do not already exist. Our point is the
more modest one that the objections commonly raised against
specialist tribunals, at least as applied to antitrust cases, are not
daunting, much less insurmountable. Whether all antitrust
cases-or perhaps only cases seeking review of a decision of an
NCA-should be singled out for resolution by a specialist court
depends, therefore, entirely upon the claim that the economic
evidence in such cases would be better understood and analyzed
byjudges who deal repeatedly with cases of the same ilk.54
54. There is little evidence available to evaluate the hypothesis that judges wvith
repeat exposure to antitrust cases perform better than their counterparts who lack
repea exposure. Baye & Widght, supra note 13, find Lha[ judicial exposure to economic

training improves performance in simple cases but draw their data from decisions by
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generalist federal judges. The Federal Trade Commission provides an opportunitythough limited by a small samplc of decisions-to test the expertise hypothesis to the
extent that it operates as a specialized appellate court sitting in review of decisions of its
administrative law judges. Federal Trade Commission decisions appear to provide little
support for the expertise hypothesis. See Joshua D. Wight & Angela M. Diveley, Do
Expert Agencies Outperorm Generalist Judges? So me Priminay Evidence From the Federal
Trade Commission, 1 J. ANTIRUST ENFORCEMENT 82 (2013) (finding, ceteris paribus,
Commission decisions are appealed to and reversed by the Courts of Appeal at a

statistically significantly greater rate than decisions by federal district court judges)

